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A B S T R A C T
This paper investigates the adoption of discourses on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest
Degradation (REDD+) across diﬀerent national contexts. It draws on institutional theories to develop and test a
number of hypotheses on the role of shared beliefs and politico-economic institutions in determining the dis-
cursive choices of policy actors. The results show that win–win ecological modernization discourse, embraced by
powerful government agencies and international actors, dominates national REDD+ policy arenas. This dis-
course is challenged primarily by a minority reformist civic environmentalist discourse put forward primarily by
domestic NGOs. We ﬁnd evidence that countries with a less democratic political system and large-scale primary
sector investments facilitate the adoption of reconciliatory ecological modernization discourse, which may not
directly challenge the drivers of deforestation. Policy actors who believe in and are engaged in market-based
approaches to REDD+ are much more likely to adopt ecological modernization discourses, compared to policy
actors who work on community development and livelihoods issues.
1. Introduction
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
(REDD+) was ﬁrst proposed in 2005 as a way to link anti-deforestation
and climate change mitigation eﬀorts. While there have been numerous
approaches to this basic idea, REDD+ can generally be seen as a ﬁ-
nancial mechanism aimed at directing results-based payments to areas
undertaking forestry projects that reduce carbon emissions, particularly
where these areas were previously subject to signiﬁcant deforestation
(Campbell, 2009).
Studies analysing REDD+ have often asked whether the initiative
has the potential to spark transformative policy changes to improve
forest protection in tropical forest countries (Brockhaus and Angelsen,
2012). A number of researchers studying REDD+ have investigated the
formation of discourse coalitions with suﬃcient power to change
business-as-usual, or, more broadly, status-quo, policies (den Besten
et al., 2014; Di Gregorio et al., 2015; Vijge et al., 2016).
What we know less about, however, is how discursive practices are
constrained and enabled by broader social contexts (Foucault, 1972).
To address this gap, this paper investigates how institutions and belief
systems aﬀect environmental discourses on REDD+. Discourses about
appropriate policy responses to environmental problems often form the
backdrop for mobilization and activism around environmental concerns
(Hajer, 1995). The studies cited in the previous paragraph, for example,
document an absence of dominant reformist or radical discourse coa-
litions that could generate transformative, or fundamental, change in
forest governance, but, because of limited attention to the interaction
between broader structures and speciﬁc discourses on REDD+, we lack
a systematic account of why such frames fail to emerge or spread
widely. We argue that developing such an account requires a multilevel
approach that integrates institutional path dependence at the national
level and belief systems at the organizational level to explain patterns in
the adoption of three broader environmental governance discourses
(Arts and Buizer, 2009; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006; Di Gregorio,
2012; Schmidt, 2008). These broader discourses, or meta-discourses,
are the discourses of ecological modernization, civic environmentalism
and green governmentality described by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand
(2006).
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Belief systems, discourses, and institutions, often have been used in
isolation as alternative explanations in accounts of policy change
(Schmidt, 2008). However, these mechanisms are complementary and
sometimes overlap (Bulkeley, 2000; Winkel et al., 2011). In formulating
a discursive response to novel policy initiatives, such as REDD+, or-
ganizations draw on prevalent broad and overarching environmental
meta-discourses (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006), selecting appro-
priate positions based on a combination of their own values and beliefs
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) and the broader institutional con-
text (Arts and Buizer, 2009; Schmidt, 2008).
To test these claims, we assess whether political institutions
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; North et al., 2009), combined with
shared beliefs, help predict organizations’ adoption of meta-discourses.
More speciﬁcally we investigate: (1) whether and to what extent or-
ganizations rely on the three meta-discourses in forming micro-dis-
courses on REDD+; (2) whether and how political institutions and
politico-economic conditions aﬀect organizations’ discursive orienta-
tion; and (3) how shared beliefs systems aﬀect organizations’ discursive
orientation.
We use a unique dataset based on a survey conducted with policy
actors engaged in the national REDD+ policy domain in eight countries
(Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Peru,
Tanzania, and Vietnam), carried out between 2010 and 2013 as part of
the Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS-REDD) (Brockhaus and
Di Gregorio, 2012). Our work builds on recent comparative analysis on
climate change and forest mitigation that goes beyond case-study re-
search to integrate evidence from multiple countries (Di Gregorio et al.,
2015; Gallemore and Munroe, 2013; Gupta et al., 2013; Korhonen-
Kurki et al., 2014; Minang et al., 2014; Vijge et al., 2016). The paper
develops a theoretical framework that uses cognitive and institutional
factors to explain patterns of adoption of environmental meta-dis-
courses. Further, the research provides new evidence about national-
level REDD+ discursive practices, in the countries implementing these
policies.
We begin by presenting our theoretical framework, explaining how
it applies to climate change and forests policy processes and deriving
hypotheses connecting institutions and beliefs to discursive practices.
This is followed by a discussion of our data collection and analytical
methods. Utilizing survey responses we then model clusters of opinion
statements with latent class regression to simultaneously identify meta-
discourses representing diﬀerent discursive orientations (or clusters)
that subsume similar positions on REDD+ (micro-discourses). The
model allows us to simultaneously assess the extent to which broad
national-level institutions, and organizational beliefs explain the dis-
tribution of these meta-discourses across our eight REDD+ countries.
We close by considering the implications of our ﬁndings for REDD+
policy and policy studies more broadly.
2. Theoretical framework
We draw on diﬀerent neo-institutional traditions, from (boundedly)
rational choice, to sociological and discursive institutionalism, to help
us analyse the determinants and distribution of environmental meta-
discourses in the climate and forests policy domain (Bäckstrand and
Lövbrand, 2006; Campbell and Pedersen, 2001; Schmidt, 2008). We
begin with New Institutional Economics, which suggests institutional
path dependence is a key obstacle to policy change (North, 1990; Peters
et al., 2005). On this account, institutions, understood as the “rules of
the game” (North, 1990: 4), facilitate cooperation among boundedly
rational individuals and are changed or maintained as a result of the
relative bargaining power of diﬀerent social groups (Williamson, 1975).
More recent work in this tradition adds that values and beliefs also
inﬂuence boundedly rational beings, in particular in policy domains
where uncertainty is high (North, 2005). Constructivist institutional
theories go further, arguing that institutions are in fact produced by
discourses (Hajer, 1995). In other words, on the constructivist account,
institutions might be altered not only due to changes in bargaining
power among actors, but also due to changes in meanings and beliefs.
Because constructivist discursive approaches risk blurring action and
structure, many studies address two-way interactions between dis-
course and institutions and suggest that analytically policy change
should be assessed from both ideational and institutional perspectives
(Hay, 2008; Phillips et al., 2004; Schmidt, 2008, 2010).
While exhibiting considerable diﬀerences, these accounts all suggest
policy transformations are a product of complex interactions between
path-dependent institutions; agents wishing to utilize, co-opt, or trans-
form existing institutional conditions; and discursive practices adopted in
the advocacy process itself (Arts and Buizer, 2009; Brockhaus and
Angelsen, 2012). While these reciprocal connections are complex, the
processes in question change at diﬀerent rates (Padgett and Powell, 2012,
2–3), providing an opportunity for analytic leverage. Our primary process
of interest − policy actors’ adoption of a discursive orientation vis-à-vis
REDD+ − takes place at the organizational level. From the perspective
of organizational leaders, it is always necessary to adapt as political cir-
cumstances and agendas change. Organizational leaders rarely success-
fully innovate their own discourses separate from broader debates on
environmental policy (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006). Instead, meta-
discourses frame audiences’ interpretations of forest and climate issues,
such that truly novel interventions may be misunderstood, actively re-
pressed, or simply ignored (Foucault, 1972). While such broad discursive
frames might not be entirely consonant with organizations’ values and
beliefs, as long as they are somewhat compatible, there is an incentive to
adopt such discourses in order to build coalitions for advocacy or im-
plementation (Di Gregorio, 2012). The relative stability of meta-dis-
courses at a global scale, in the short run, suggests that we should observe
organizations’ positions on REDD+ (micro-discourses) to cluster around
the three meta-discourses that have emerged from countless discursive
acts over time.
REDD+ discursive practices are informed by actors’ values and
beliefs (Bulkeley, 2000; Di Gregorio, 2012). While social learning might
be expected to change beliefs at the organizational level over time, in
the short term we can consider deep core beliefs − the “broadest and
most stable among the beliefs” and policy core beliefs− the normative
commitments and understanding of causal linkages in a given policy
subsystem − to be relatively ﬁxed (Weible et al., 2009: 122). Policy
core beliefs include priorities such as the importance of economic
growth versus environmental protection, the appropriate division of
authority between government and markets, and core value priorities of
a subsystems such as the need to address inequalities and poverty or to
facilitate growth in order to achieve sustainability (Sabatier, 1997).
Secondary policy beliefs, such as deciding what position to take with
regard to a novel policy issue like REDD+, tend to have a more rapid
temporal pace as they are informed by more immediate strategic con-
cerns as new issues arise on the organization’s agenda (Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith, 1993).
Organizational leaders’ discursive positions and beliefs are also
necessarily constrained by institutional conditions (Arts and Buizer,
2009), including political institutional conditions at the national level,
such as the degree of democratic control of the polity, and the broader
political economic context, including factors like the political dom-
inance of speciﬁc economic sectors in society. While over the long term
dominant organizations’ discursive practices may become in-
stitutionalized (Hajer, 1995), these broad institutional factors may be
taken as relatively ﬁxed in the short term (North, 1990). That is to say,
while there is certainly a complex range of factors aﬀecting the adop-
tion of meta-discourses, we can get leverage on the role of at least some
of those factors, including political institutions and politico-economic
conditions, and policy core beliefs, which are unlikely to be endogenous
in the short term. Fig. 1 summarizes the main elements of our model.
Next, we discuss the each elements in more detail. First we discuss
the three meta-discourses, and then the institutional and the belief-
based factors that aﬀect the adoption of meta-discourses.
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2.1. Environmental meta-discourses on REDD+
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, (2006, 50) contend that debates sur-
rounding forest carbon projects are a “microcosm” of three broader
meta-discourses regarding global environmental governance: ecological
modernization, green governmentality, and civic environmentalism.
Ecological modernization is a win–win narrative, in which economic
growth and environmental protection are either already mutually
consistent or can readily be reconciled with simple institutional
changes. Weak forms of ecological modernization focus on technolo-
gical solutions and modest governance reforms, while strong forms
entail broader changes in institutions and economic structures, fa-
vouring open and democratic decision-making (Christoﬀ, 1996). Green
governmentality discourses, on the other hand, are focused heavily on
the techno-scientiﬁc management of individuals and nonhuman sys-
tems, situating the state and scientiﬁc and policy experts in positions of
considerable authority. Some versions feature more elitist, globalizing
and top-down visions, while others admit reﬂexive approaches
(Jasanoﬀ and Martello, 2004). Civic environmentalism, ﬁnally, also has
two poles. A reformist version calls for excluded and disenfranchised
groups to be active participants in environmental projects, while more
radical adherents contend the extant global order is inherently in-
equitable and unsustainable, necessitating dramatic transformation.
Very similar positions are articulated in global REDD+ debates.
Early proponents of REDD+, for example, often adopted ecological
modernisation’s win–win outlook, contending that REDD+ would be
“big, quick, and cheap” (Angelsen and McNeill, 2012, 33; Di Gregorio
et al., 2015; den Besten et al., 2014; McDermott et al., 2011). Over time,
however, advocates raised civic environmentalism critiques of REDD+,
fearing for the rights and livelihoods of forest-dwelling peoples (Gupta,
2012). Technically sophisticated commentators participated in these
debates, as well, pointing out diﬃculties with measurement, mon-
itoring, and veriﬁcation of emissions as they echoed green govern-
mentality themes (De Sy et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2012).
Previous research has documented some similarities and diﬀerences
in dominant REDD+ discourses across countries. There is, for example,
a general tendency to consider broad co-beneﬁts compared to just
emission reduction aims, to recognize the role of community, as op-
posed to expert-based monitoring, and to privilege market, as compared
to fund-based approaches, and there are also diﬀerences of opinion on
whether national or subnational REDD+ accounting approaches should
be pursued (Vijge et al., 2016). Each of these conﬂicting positions can
be subsumed under one of the three meta-discourses identiﬁed by
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006). Consequently, REDD+ micro-dis-
courses might cluster under ecological modernization, green govern-
mentality, of civic environmentalism discourses. The next step is to
explain the institutional and belief-based determinants of these dis-
cursive orientations.
2.2. Institutional context and discursive practices
Formal and informal institutions have tangible eﬀects, establishing
certain practices as legitimate or illegitimate, aﬀecting who has the
right to speak in what capacity, and grounding relationships of power
and resource access (Lukes, 2005). Political institutions, such as the
type of political regime and other politico-economic factors, such as the
evolution of the constellation of power in key economic sectors, con-
strain agents’ actions, including their discursive strategies (Phillips
et al., 2004; Schmidt, 2008). This presents a problem: institutional
path-dependence can constrain the formation of reformist discursive
orientations necessary for the transformational change required to ad-
dress the drivers of forest loss (Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014).
We would expect variations in political institutions and politico-
economic context to systematically favour or constrain certain dis-
cursive practices. Countries with more democratic political systems, all
else equal, provide more space for civil society, making it safer to adopt
reformist or even radical discourses (McAdam et al., 1996). Conversely,
in authoritarian regimes, where dissident political discourses are sup-
pressed (Wedeen, 1999), we would expect to observe civic en-
vironmentalism perspectives less often. This leads up to our ﬁrst hy-
pothesis:
H1: Organizations in countries with greater democratic control will
be more likely to adopt civic environmentalism discourses.
Politico-economic conditions that grant power to particular vested
interests are also likely to impact the adoption of discourses. The
strength of status-quo interests − that is, groups whose interests might
be negatively aﬀected by changes required to bring about transitions to
sustainability − is critical (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012). Countries
in which status-quo interests are stronger will be likely to exhibit more
win–win discourses, which are more amenable to business-as-usual
arguments opposing signiﬁcant− or sometimes any− changes. In the
case of REDD+, we would expect that in countries where large-scale
forestry and agricultural interests are particularly powerful, organiza-
tions would be more likely to adopt weak ecological modernization
discourses, more amenable to the interests of this powerful sector,
compared to civic environmentalism. Thus, our second hypothesis
reads:
H2: Countries where large-scale primary sector interests are strong
will exhibit higher rates of ecological modernization discourse.
2.3. Beliefs and discursive practices
At the organizational level, cognitive approaches like Sabatier & s
(1988) Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) suggest that shared belief
systems, in particular policy core beliefs, are the basis of coalition
formation. Constructivist discursive approaches, such as Hajer & s
(1995) discourse coalition framework, instead, contend discursive
practices perform the same role. Traditionally, these two approaches
have been considered alternative explanations of policy change.
Discursive 
Clusters
Political Institutions Politico-economic Conditions Policy Core Beliefs
Fig. 1. Model of the theoretical framework.
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However, both accounts revolve around the importance of ideas
(Winkel et al., 2011). In fact, the systems of beliefs of the ACF, and their
related underlying values, tend to be formulated as meanings of dis-
course. In other words, discourses express, reproduce, or enact belief
systems (Van Dijk, 2006).
While discourses tend to be very broad and can be used strategically
to seek instrumental alliances, people's core policy beliefs are more
distinct, and are likely to be reﬂected in their key activities. For ex-
ample, an organization that works on community development projects
should value poverty alleviation as a key policy core belief. We there-
fore rely on speciﬁc organization’s level of engagement in certain ac-
tivities as a proxy indicator of policy core beliefs. In the case of REDD
+, market-based approaches, community livelihoods development, and
technical policy development and performance monitoring have be-
come particularly politically important. In turn the policy core beliefs
associated with these activities map onto diﬀerent meta-discourses.
Activities linked to carbon measurement and trading and implementa-
tion of REDD+ schemes are closely aligned with win–win market-based
environmental approaches (Dixon and Challies, 2015; Gallemore et al.,
2015; Winkel et al., 2011). Consequently, we argue that:
H3: Organizations specializing in carbon markets will be more likely
to adopt ecological modernization discourses.
This same logic holds for organizations engaged in community li-
velihoods development. In the REDD+ context, this generally means
being involved in sustainable livelihoods activities and community
rights advocacy. These reﬂect more reformist and sometimes even
transformative policy core beliefs that aim at changing underlying
conditions driving environmental damage. In contrast to those of or-
ganizations engaged in carbon trading and markets:
H4: Organizations specializing in community livelihoods develop-
ment will be more likely to adopt civic environmentalism discourses.
Finally, as noted above, there has been a signiﬁcant demand for
scientiﬁc research in support of REDD+, particularly to develop ef-
fective techniques to estimate carbon stocks and to assess mitigation
reductions resulting from avoided deforestation (Romijn et al., 2012).
Due to the scientiﬁc and technical focus of these activities we would
expect that:
H5: Organizations engaged in research and policy design will be
more likely to adopt green governmentality discourses.
Fig. 2 summarizes the hypotheses and relationships between vari-
ables described above.
3. Methods
The primary data for this study was derived from a multi-country
study on national REDD+ policy processes. While this survey was de-
signed primarily to assess organizations’ positions on REDD+ for the
purposes of applied policy process analysis, it also provides a unique
opportunity to study the determinants and distribution of discursive
orientations in an emerging environmental policy arena. We used data
from eight countries considered early starters on REDD+ (Angelsen
et al., 2012; Arts et al., 2013): Brazil, Peru, Cameroon, Tanzania, In-
donesia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam. For all countries, we
utilized data on organizations engaged in REDD+ policy at the national
level, and, in the case of Indonesia, additionally used data on those
active in the province of Central Kalimantan, which was designated by
the national government to pilot jurisdictional REDD+, putting it on
the forefront of national REDD+ policy development. We replicated
our model estimations without these provincial actors as a robustness
check (Tables B2 and B3).
Data were collected using a standardized collection method for all
countries based on an in-person survey administered in the national
language or English, based on respondents’ preferences. Organizations
engaged in REDD+ policy were identiﬁed based on country teams’
knowledge and media searches, which involved collecting articles
mentioning REDD+ from three to ﬁve of the largest circulation
newspapers in each country over a 2005–2010, noting organizations
and individuals mentioned as policy actors on REDD+ or directly
quoted in each article. Once a list was compiled, a panel of ﬁve to ten
experts from government, civil society, academia, and/or the private
sector in each country or province reviewed the list, identifying orga-
nizations actively engaged in REDD+ policy processes, suggesting ad-
ditional relevant and deleting non-relevant organizations. High-level
representatives of these organizations were invited to participate in the
organizational survey. Potential interviewees were briefed on the pur-
pose of the study, which was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of
framing and policy networking engaged in REDD+ across multiple
countries. Upon receiving informed consent from the organization’s
representative, surveys were administered in person by one or more
interviewers. Interviews were recorded and transcribed if the inter-
viewee granted permission, and all ﬁxed-response survey data were
recorded by the interviewers in a common database. Transcripts from
interviews were consulted to provide context for the clusters estimated
below. Our primary outcome variable in the study discussed here comes
from 35 statements gauging organizations’ framing of REDD+.
Respondents were asked to rate each of these opinion statements on a
ﬁve-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” For
modelling purposes, we dichotomized these scales, assigning a 1 to
“Agree” or “Strongly Agree” and 0 otherwise. Our modelling objective
was to assign organizations into clusters based on the pattern of their
agreement with these stances.
3.1. Modelling the determinants of meta-discourses on climate and forests
While there is certainly a reciprocal relationship between organi-
zations’ discursive practices and broader politico-economic institutions
(Schön and Rein, 1994; Benford and Snow, 2000), the models estimated
in this paper focuses on how institutions and belief systems aﬀect or-
ganizations’ discursive practices. While these practices, in turn, reshape
institutions and beliefs systems, they do so on longer timescales than
could be captured in a single cross-sectional study. Therefore, in this
particular analysis we do not explicitly consider how organizations’
discourses about REDD+ could in turn aﬀect fundamental institutional
contexts or global meta-discourses on the environment like those stu-
died here. In eﬀect, we apply an “analytical dualism” (Archer, 1996),
treating agents and structures as distinct, a technique we consider
justiﬁed due to the diﬀerence in timescales upon which structures and
our phenomena of interest − organizations’ discursive and collabora-
tion strategies − evolve.
To identify clusters in organizations’ stances on REDD+ across
countries, we utilized latent class regression, as implemented in the
poLCA Package in R (Linzer and Lewis, 2011; R Core Team, 2015).
Latent Class Regression has been used previously in literature on land-
use decision-making (Poppenborg and Koellner, 2013) and has a long
tradition in public opinion research (McCutcheon, 1985). Here, we
adopted it to group organizations into clusters of diﬀerent stances,
based on their representatives’ responses to opinion statements re-
garding REDD+. Simultaneously, we modelled factors explaining
which organizations fall into each classiﬁcation using a set of variables
designed to proxy beliefs and values through organizational char-
acteristics, as well as the political and politico-economic institutional
context.
Latent class regression is an extension of latent class analysis, which
classiﬁes observations into a predetermined number of clusters based
on the value of categorical variables. The model simultaneously esti-
mates the clusters and a multinomial logistic regression that can be
used to relate explanatory variables to resulting clusters, helping avoid
biased coeﬃcients. The resulting model estimates provide information
about both the classes into which observations fall and the relationship
between independent variables and observations’ classiﬁcations.
Latent class models are a type of ﬁnite mixture model, in which
outcome variables are modelled as the result of a combination of
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distinct probability distributions. As Linzer (2011, 175) explains the
approach, we can think of a population as consisting of diﬀerent types
of individuals, or, in our case, organizations, whose attitudes might be
similar within classes and diﬀerent between them. The model identiﬁes
these classiﬁcations by estimating the probability that an individual in a
given class responds to an item in a particular way.
The ﬁt of latent cluster regression models is generally evaluated by
Akaike Information Criteria, Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), or
Pearson’s Chi-squared tests (Linzer and Lewis, 2011). In our case, we
utilized BIC to select the appropriate number of classes because it al-
lows us to balance model ﬁt and parsimony. Further, we assessed our
best model’s predictive adequacy using Receiver Operating Character-
istic (ROC) curves (Bradley, 1997), which measure prediction success
by the area under a curve created by plotting false positives against
false negatives for diﬀerent cutoﬀ values of predicted probability. The
measure ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect prediction. As the
measure is designed for binary classiﬁcation, we plotted and computed
the area under separate ROC curves for each cluster identiﬁed by the
model. In addition, because we expect discourses to lead to consistent
responses across opinion statements, and to ensure our ﬁndings are
robust, we ﬁtted our models on a random subset of 20 of the 35 stances
used from the survey, reserving 15 for cross-validation (see Appendix A
Table A1 for the complete description of the stances). This approach
provides additional information on the validity of the resulting clusters
by allowing us to see if the clusters of organizations identiﬁed by our
models are also statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent on any opinion items
that were not directly modelled.
3.2. Latent class regression variables and data
Our hypothesis regarding the political institutional context focuses
on democratic control of the political system. To measure democratic
control, we used Polity IV democracy scores (Marshall et al., 2014). A
common measure of democratic governance, the Polity IV index ranges
from −10 (autocracy) to 10 (consolidated democracy). For each
country in our sample, we computed the mean score between 2008 and
2012, the primary years of REDD+ activity around the time our survey
was administered (Democracy). As indicators of politico-economic
conditions and status-quo interests we utilized data from the Food and
Agriculture Organization (2017) on average gross ﬁxed capital forma-
tion in the non-mining primary sector (that is, forestry, agriculture, and
ﬁshing) between 2008 and 2012. To normalize this variable, we cal-
culate it as the number of US$ per US$1000 of gross domestic product,
in constant 2005 dollars and scale it in standard deviations for ease of
model interpretation (Primary Capital).
Core policy beliefs were proxied through key organizational activ-
ities. To identify organizations that support market-based policy ap-
proaches we considered whether they were considerably engaged in
carbon measurement or trading activities. We computed the proportion
of times a respondent organization reported expending “much” or “very
much” eﬀort on “REDD-related carbon trading/brokerage” and
“Implementation of REDD site activities (including demonstration sites
activities, e.g. Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and UN-REDD in-
itiatives)” (Market). We identiﬁed organizations engaged in community
livelihoods development using the same technique, based on reported
eﬀorts on “Tenure rights (land, trees),” “Poverty alleviation and equity
(including distribution of REDD revenues),” and “Community-based or
joint forest management” (Community). Finally, we operationalized
research and policy design activities using the same technique again,
this time using reported eﬀorts on “Design of national level REDD
strategies and policies,” “Design of sub-national level REDD strategies
and policies,” and “REDD scientiﬁc research” (Policy & Research).
At the national level, we controlled for overall economic develop-
ment using the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant US
$2011, by purchasing power parity (ln GDP Per Capita), taken from the
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015) and averaged from
2008 to 2012. In addition, to control for unmeasured variation in in-
stitutional conditions, we estimated models with and without
Ecological 
Modernization
Civic 
Environmentalism
Green 
Governmentality
Cluster 
Identification
Distribution of organizational 
responses on REDD+ opinion items
Dependent Variable
Political 
institutions & 
political economic 
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DemocracyPrimary Sector Interests 
Organizational Variables
Specialization in 
Carbon Markets
Specialization in 
Livelihoods
Specialization in 
Research/Design
H1 H2
H
3 H
4
H
5
Country Context Variables
Expected 
organizations’ 
discursive clusters
Policy core beliefs
Fig. 2. Operationalization of the model.
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organizational type and country ﬁxed eﬀects. At the organizational
level, we grouped policy actors into six categories by type. The ﬁrst,
Government, includes all domestic government agencies, at the na-
tional or subnational level. Academic, our second classiﬁcation, in-
cludes national research institutes, think tanks, and universities. Do-
mestic NGOs include NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs)
headquartered in the country for which they were surveyed, and form
our third class. This class also includes any rural or indigenous orga-
nizations active in national REDD+ policy arenas. Private Sector or-
ganizations, which include ﬁrms, trade associations, and consultants,
make up our fourth group. Our ﬁfth group is composed of International
NGOs− that is, NGOs not headquartered in the country for which they
are respondents. Finally, our sixth group is made up of Donor Agencies,
whether international organizations or the development agencies of
donor governments. A summary of our continuously valued variables is
presented in Table 1 and a correlation matrix in Table 2.
3.3. Methods for interpreting clusters
To aid interpretation of our latent class models, we conducted some
additional analysis using the clusters determined by our optimal latent
class model. We visualized diﬀerences in organizational responses by
cluster on both the ﬁtted and the cross-validation opinion statements.
Also, we computed diﬀerence of proportions tests comparing the pro-
portion of agreement with each item between our primary clusters,
using 10,000 random permutations of the cluster assignments to test for
statistical signiﬁcance, using a Bonferroni correction (Dunn, 1961). We
also utilize a measure of reputational power (Krackhardt, 1990;
Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970) to compare the relative inﬂuence of the
discursive orientations (clusters) we identify across the countries sur-
veyed. We measure reputational power by taking the sum of all re-
spondent organizations listing a given organization as “particularly
inﬂuential on REDD+ policy in [country]” in our survey. For com-
parability, we divide scores by the total number of organizations in-
terviewed in each country.
4. Results
4.1. Identifying meta-discourses
The estimated latent class regression models are presented in Tables
3 and B1. Based on lowest BIC, we ﬁnd that a three cluster solution is
the most appropriate. While we estimate multiple models due to con-
cerns about multicollinearity, membership in the three clusters is quite
stable across models. To aid in interpretation of the estimated clusters,
we present agreement on all 35 opinion statements, by clusters esti-
mated by Model 3, our preferred model, in Fig. 1. We ﬁnd a cluster of
about 8% of the 428 organizational respondents that have low response
rates across the opinion statements (see Fig B1 in Appendix B for de-
tailed responses from this group). We call this the ‘No Comment’
cluster. Notably, private sector actors seem to be much more likely to
show up in this cluster, as are organizations active in less democratic
countries, suggesting that a combination of strategic interests and po-
litical constraints may be making these organizations too risk-averse to
take stances on many of our opinion items, even conﬁdentially (Fig.
B2). In qualitative interviews conducted along with the survey, many of
these actors expressed low conﬁdence in their expertise on REDD+,
suggesting they may be marginal. One notable exception, however,
were some governmental agencies, in particular Vietnam, who did not
want to expresses or commit to a particular position on REDD+. Given
that these organizations’ responses give us little information about their
position, we focus on the two main clusters (accounting for about 92%
Table 1
Continuously valued variables used in model estimation.
Variable type Variable name Mean St Dev Max Description
Political Institutions Democracy 3.73 5.62 9 Mean Polity IV country score, 2008–2012 (H1)
Politico- economic
conditions
Primary Capital 0 1 1.78 Dollar value of ﬁxed primary capital formation per US$ 1 billion of GDP, scaled in standard
deviations (H2)
Policy Core Beliefs Market 0.102 0.133 0.667 Proportion of times organization reported “Much” or “Very Much” eﬀort in REDD+ carbon
oﬀsetting activities (H3)
Community 0.286 0.216 1 Proportion of times organization reported “Much” or “Very Much” eﬀort in community development
activities (H4)
Policy & Research 0.393 0.366 1 Proportion of times organization report “Much” or “Very Much” eﬀort in designing subnational or
national policy or scientiﬁc research (H5)
Control GDP Per Capita 6462 4182 14281 Gross domestic product per capita (Control)
Table 2
There is a mistake in the numbers in table 2: The table should read: see attached xls ﬁle
Correlation matrix of continuously valued variables used in latent cluster regression
model estimation.
Democracy GDP
Per Capita
Primary
Capital
Market Community
GDP Per Capita 0.577
Primary Capital −0.618 −0.894
Market 0.023 0.048 0.008
Community −0.014 −0.100 0.070 −0.112
Policy & Research 0.066 0.045 0.002 0.447 −0.063
Table 3
Full description and level of agreement of opinion statements with statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between Ecological Modernization and Civic Environmentalism groups. Statement
numbers correspond to statement numbers in Fig. 3.
Overall Percentage Agree/Strongly
Agree
Opinion Statements Label in Fig. 1
77% REDD+ is an eﬀective option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions globally 01 − Eﬀective
77% REDD+ schemes will provide incentives and resources to improve forest governance (e.g. illegal
logging and rule of law)
16 − Improve forest governance
73% REDD+ schemes are also likely to help countries to cope or adapt to the impacts of climate change 31 − Adaptation beneﬁts
58% REDD+ is a ﬁnancially aﬀordable way to mitigate climate change 02 − Aﬀordable
57% REDD+ schemes will be an important resource to reduce poverty 14 − Reduced poverty
38% REDD schemes will exacerbate conﬂicts about forest land and forest resources 10 − Exacerbate conﬂict
32% REDD+ will assure fairness in the international distribution of environmental costs and beneﬁts 03 − Fair
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01. Effective 02. Affordable 03. Fair 04. Funds only 05. Offsets
06. No monocultures 07. National only 08. Largeíscale rewards 09. Local rewards 10. Exacerbate conflicts
11. &oíbenefits 12. Tenure rights 13. CO2 vs. Biodiversity 14. Reduce poverty 15. Involve locals
16. Improve forest governance 17. Governance first 18. Weaken state 19. Lack of knowledge 20. Poor coordination
21. Technical limits 22. Clarify tenure 23. Legal contradictions 24. Social conflict 25. Address drivers
26. Land use consensus 27. Enforcement capacity 28. Special interests 29. Science is authority 30. Science dominates
31. Adaptation benefits 32. FPIC 33. Forest conservation 34. Leakage and permanence 35. National approach best
No Comment
Ecological Modernization
Civic Environmentalism
No Comment
Ecological Modernization
Civic Environmentalism
No Comment
Ecological Modernization
Civic Environmentalism
No Comment
Ecological Modernization
Civic Environmentalism
No Comment
Ecological Modernization
Civic Environmentalism
No Comment
Ecological Modernization
Civic Environmentalism
No Comment
Ecological Modernization
Civic Environmentalism
0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100
Agreement (%)
Fig. 3. Percentage agreement with opinions statements, by cluster (see Table A1 in Appendix A for the full description of the 25 opinion statements). Bolded entries indicate stances with
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between Ecological Modernization and Civic Environmentalism Groups, based on 10,000 permutations of group assignments, with a Bonferroni
correction. Created using ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
Table 4
Estimated Latent Class Regression model with 3 clusters, Civic Environmentalism versus Ecological Modernization. See Appendix B Table B1 for No Comment versus Ecological
Modernization results. P-value of likelihood-ratio test against an intercept-only model with three clusters = 0.000. * = sig. at 0.05, ** = sig. at 0.01, *** = sig. at 0.001. The preferred
Model 3 is presented in bold letters.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 0.499***
(0.146)
2.98
(4.26)
−2.18***
(0.538)
−1.86***
(0.480)
−6.10**
(2.31)
2.97
(4.29)
Community 2.13**
(0.820)
2.30**
(0.731)
2.19**
(0.726)
2.19**
(0.719)
2.08**
(0.712)
2.24**
(0.729)
Market −4.16*
(1.80)
−2.98*
(1.51)
−3.45*
(1.52)
−3.16*
(1.49)
−3.51*
(1.49)
−2.91
(1.50)
Policy & Research 0.763
(0.587)
0.478
(0.491)
0.420
(0.486)
0.485
(0.484)
0.470
(0.477)
0.529
(0.490)
Democracy 0.552***
(0.0580)
0.0508
(0.0441)
0.0872*
(0.0350)
Primary Capital 0.665*
(0.307)
−0.716
(0.377)
−0.497**
(0.180)
−0.888*
(0.373)
GDP Per Capita (ln) −0.786***
(0.0844)
−0.593
(0.505)
0.503*
(0.249)
−0.564
(0.503)
Research/Academic 1.59*
(0.808)
1.18
(0.613)
1.21*
(0.610)
1.11
(0.607)
1.12
(0.600)
1.06
(0.611)
Domestic NGO 1.61**
(0.535)
1.55***
(0.457)
1.55***
(0.465)
1.56***
(0.454)
1.57***
(0.455)
1.52***
(0.450)
Private Sector 0.454
(0.658)
0.613
(0.680)
0.649
(0.655)
0.640
(0.659)
0.678
(0.647)
0.558
(0.682)
International NGO 0.450
(0.658)
−1.94
(2.78)
0.237
(0.597)
0.230
(0.588)
0.270
(0.585)
0.0968
(0.590)
Donor Agency 0.606
(0.622)
0.485
(0.593)
0.490
(0.587)
0.490
(0.576)
0.488
(0.590)
0.385
(0.583)
Country Fixed Eﬀects Yes No No No No No
N 428 428 428 428 428 428
BIC 9149 9116 9102 9105 9117 9113
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of respondents) in our interpretation.
The two other clusters we identify have statistically signiﬁcant and
substantively important diﬀerences across the opinion statements,
though their points of agreement are equally telling. Fig. 3 and Table 3
highlight opinion statements where the two groups’ responses are sta-
tistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. The ﬁrst of the two groups, accounting
for about 59% of the sample, is more optimistic about the potential for
REDD+ to eﬀectively reduce emissions at a low cost while simulta-
neously improving livelihoods and forest governance. In keeping with
the discussion of prevailing international discourses on forest policy
above (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006), we identify the statements in
the cluster as reﬂecting Ecological Modernization discourse. The second
group, at about 33% of the sample, is much more sceptical of REDD
+ ’s impacts on forests, climate change, and poverty, its members
concerned with fairness and the risk of conﬂict. In interviews, many of
these organizations were openly sceptical about the role of markets in
forest carbon policy, an important distinction separating these positions
statements from Ecological Modernization discourse. Also based on the
discussion of global discourses outlined above, we identify these clus-
ters of positions statements as representing as predominantly Civic
Environmentalism discourse.
These ﬁndings suggest that organizations’ opinions draw on en-
vironmental meta-discourses to frame REDD+. However, we ﬁnd no
cluster that can be equated with the green governmentality discourse.
This could result from the survey design, which included few opinion
statements on science and REDD+. Also, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand
(2006) argue that reﬂexive forms of Green Governmentality overlap
with Civic Environmentalism discourse, while more elitist technocratic
forms overlap with weak Ecological Modernization positions, so Green
Governmentality adherents may have been classiﬁed into one of these
two other discourse clusters. On the other hand, previous media-based
research on national REDD+ discourses found Green Governmentality
to be a minority discourse observed only in one tenth of opinions ex-
pressed in the media in seven of the eight countries investigated in this
paper (Di Gregorio et al., 2015). It may be that despite REDD+ being
considered a technical issue, green governmentality discourses are not,
in practice, a focal point for national level REDD+ policy discussions in
the way they are studied here.
The points of agreement between the two main groups are as telling
as their diﬀerences. There is generally consensus on the range of pro-
blems facing REDD+ across countries, for example. What distinguishes
the Ecological Modernization and Civic Environmentalism groups is less
their perception of what the problem is, such as land-use planning or
governmental capacity, but, rather, the degree to which they are opti-
mistic that governance reforms and market-oriented approaches are
adequate responses, with Civic Environmentalism being much more
sceptical about the potential of REDD+ to deliver eﬀectiveness and
equity.
4.2. Modelling the adoption of meta-discourses
We estimate a number of diﬀerent latent class regression models.
Due to concerns of multicollinearity between GDP Per Capita, Primary
Capital, and Democracy variables (see Table 2), we estimate a number
of models including GDP Per Capita, Primary Capital, and Democracy
separately, as well as full models with and without ﬁxed eﬀects by
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Fig. 4. Predicted probabilities for continuous vari-
ables using coeﬃcients estimated in Model 3.
Organization type set to Government, all other
variables set at their means. Plots show the prob-
ability that an organization adopts each of the three
discourses as the value of the independent variables
change. Variables are plotted across their complete
range in the data. Created with ggplot2 (Wickham,
2009) in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
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Fig. 5. Normalized reputational power, by cluster. Created using ggplot2 (Wickham,
2009) in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
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country. We ﬁnd that models with ﬁxed eﬀects, such as Model 1, per-
form poorly on BIC related to models without ﬁxed eﬀects for all spe-
ciﬁcations and therefore only report the full ﬁxed eﬀects model
(Table 4). Finally, we estimate a model with both Primary Capital and
GDP Per Capita as a way of checking that the Capital variable is not just
proxying for the level of economic development. While Primary Capital
and Democracy have their expected sign and signiﬁcance on their own,
they are too highly correlated for their eﬀects to be distinguished
clearly. Democracy, for example, is not statistically signiﬁcant when
included in a model with GDP Per Capita (not shown), but, as seen in
Model 6, Primary Capital continues to have a statistically signiﬁcant,
negative eﬀect even when controlling for GDP Per Capita, which it
outperforms. The model with the lowest BIC, Model 3, includes the
Democracy variable alone. As it is both our best balance of ﬁt and
parsimony and avoids multicollinearity with GDP Per Capita, we focus
on it in our interpretation, referring to the other models as necessary.
To aid interpretation, we provide predicted probability plots for con-
tinuous variables based on the coeﬃcients estimated in Model 3 in
Fig. 4 and predicted probability changes based on organization type in
Table B4 in Appendix B.
National political institutions appear to have statistically and sub-
stantively signiﬁcant relationships with the adoption of particular dis-
cursive strategies, but it is diﬃcult to distinguish these relationships
from one another and the eﬀects of economic development more
broadly. On their own, Democracy is positively and Primary Capital
negatively associated with the adoption of Civic Environmentalism
discourses (H1, H2). However, while Primary Capital retains its sign
and signiﬁcance when controlling for GDP Per Capita, this is not the
case for Democracy, which, while still positive, is no longer statistically
signiﬁcant (p = 0.112) in a model without ﬁxed eﬀects and excluding
only Primary Capital (not shown). However, both Democracy and
Primary Capital outperform GDP Per Capita in explanatory power,
based on lowest BIC, suggesting that institutional conditions, rather
than the overall level of economic development, are more closely as-
sociated with organizations’ discursive practices.
With regards to core policy beliefs, we ﬁnd that specialization in
carbon oﬀsetting decreases the probability that an organization will
adopt Civic Environmentalism discourses (H3) across all models except
Model 6, where the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant (p = 0.053), while
specialization in community development activities is positively asso-
ciated increases the probability across all models (H4). We do not,
however, ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of Policy & Research
variable on the propensity to adopt Civic Environmentalism discourses.
This could be in part because of the absence of a clear Green
Governmentality discourse cluster, which we would expect to be most
aﬀected by these activities.
Controlling for type of organization shows that domestic NGOs and
CSOs are more likely than state, donors, international NGOs, and pri-
vate sector organizations to adopt Civic Environmentalism discourses,
as, in several models, are Research and Academic organizations. It is
telling that we ﬁnd this eﬀect for domestic NGOs and not international
NGOs, which have been found to act more in concert with donor
agencies in some REDD+ countries (Moeliono et al., 2014).
4.3. Reputational power across clusters
Fig. 5 presents the distribution of reputational power for Ecological
Modernization and Civic Environmentalism clusters across countries.
Consistent with ﬁndings of prior studies of policy advocacy on REDD+
(Babon et al., 2014; Korhonen-Kurki et al., 2014; Di Gregorio et al.,
2015), we ﬁnd that the Ecological Modernization cluster is not only
more numerous than the Civic Environmentalism cluster, its adherents
also tend to be recognized as more powerful.
5. Discussion
While several studies have focused on the question of how discourse
coalitions can aﬀect policy outcomes (Bulkeley, 2000; den Besten et al.,
2014; Hajer, 1995), there are also important questions regarding the
feedbacks between broader institutions, belief systems and discursive
orientations (Schmidt, 2008). Taking advantage of a unique dataset, we
have tested ﬁve hypotheses regarding organizations’ adoption of par-
ticular discourses in diﬀerent national contexts. We ﬁnd compelling
evidence that organizations discursive practices are inﬂuenced by their
shared beliefs and, at the same time, are constrained by the broader
institutional context (Weible et al., 2009; Arts and Buizer, 2009; Di
Gregorio, 2012). We show that while comparing the adoption of dis-
courses across national contexts can be demanding in terms of re-
sources, it is possible to combine these research eﬀorts with broad
multi-country studies like the one utilized here. Model-based cluster
analysis can be helpful in identifying meta-discourses (Bhatia et al.,
2008).
Our ﬁndings indicate that not only do national level political in-
stitutions and politico-economic conditions impact organizations’
ability to aﬀect policy change (Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012), they
also constrain the types of ideas that are circulated in discourse, in the
ﬁrst place (Foucault, 1972; Smith 2008; North, 2005). Such path-de-
pendencies place barriers in the way of the kind of transformations
expected to be necessary for approaches like REDD+ to result in ef-
fective changes in environmental governance (Brockhaus et al., 2016).
However, we are not fully able to distinguish the eﬀects of the broader
political economy and democratic institutions. Understanding the un-
ique contributions of these two diﬀerent forms of institutional context
should be a consideration in case selection for future research in this
area.
At the same time, shared belief systems represent key building
blocks of broad discursive practices (Di Gregorio, 2012; Elgert, 2012;
Forsyth, 2003). In particular, the divide between policy core beliefs that
have a fundamentally positive outlook about REDD+ and prioritize
market-based solutions from those that prioritize community develop-
ment objectives, non-carbon beneﬁts and highlight distributive con-
cern, seem to have crystallized into distinct orientations in REDD+
discourse in numerous countries (Vijge at al., 2016). These shared
policy core beliefs, while themselves impacted by institutional condi-
tions, contribute to the formation and strength of policy coalitions,
advocating distinct positions, some favouring business-as-usual others
demanding transformative change (Babon et al., 2014). Overall, and
consistent with previous research on climate and forests, we ﬁnd that
organizations engaged in REDD+ tend to adopt more conservative
Ecological Modernization discourses, as compared to Civic En-
vironmentalism perspectives (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006; Di
Gregorio et al., 2015).
6. Conclusion
This study has drawn on diverse neo-institutional traditions to ex-
plain the distribution of broad discursive practices in eight REDD+
countries. While these approaches have often been used in isolation,
thinking of them as complementary approaches identifying processes
operating at diﬀerent levels provides a more holistic picture of REDD+
policy processes. On the one hand, rational-choice explanations of in-
stitutional path dependencies help us study broad, slow processes that
provide the context in which organizations adopt discursive practices.
Yet, discursive choices are also informed by shared beliefs systems,
which facilitate or constrain the formation of much more ﬂuid dis-
course coalitions.
Most importantly from a policy perspective, this study underlines
the dominance of simplistic win–win ecological modernization dis-
courses and associated politico-economic challenges that REDD+ faces
in reversing the drivers of deforestation within national contexts. This is
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not to say that there is no possibility of such change. What these
ﬁndings do suggest, however, is that transformations toward more de-
mocratic governance − whether through long-term policy learning,
political contention or evolutionary changes − and the presence of
substantive constituencies that value the protection of local rights and
livelihoods, provide the necessary basis for reformist discourses to
emerge and spread. At present, in national REDD+ domains Civic
Environmentalism discourses remain minority discourses, both in terms
of numbers and political inﬂuence. Yet, how these perspectives might
evolve to overcome politico-economic path dependencies remains an
important area for further research. Studying the role of coalition
building, collaboration and normative change via long term discursive-
institutional co-evolution will continue to be an important part of de-
veloping accounts of advocacy on global environmental concerns.
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Table A1
Opinion statements (stances) used in model ﬁtting and cross validation. 15 statements were chosen as a compromise between providing a rigorous test of the model by providing more
statements that can be used to assess the model’s validity, and providing suﬃcient numbers of statements for the model to ﬁt. The statements chosen as cross-validation statements were
randomly selected by the statistical software R (R Core Team, 2015).
Numbering Opinion Statements Percentage Agree/Strongly
Agree
Use
1 REDD is an eﬀective option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions globally 77% Model
2 REDD is a ﬁnancially aﬀordable way to mitigate climate change 58% Model
3 REDD will assure fairness in the international distribution of environmental costs and beneﬁts 32% Model
4 REDD schemes should only be ﬁnanced through funds 28% Model
5 In the long-run REDD should be included in schemes to oﬀset credits in compliance carbon markets 59% Model
6 In the post-Kyoto regime the deﬁnition of forest should exclude monocultures 43% Model
7 All REDD accounting and payments should go through the national governments 32% Model
8 REDD beneﬁts should reward large-scale industries/companies for reducing forest emissions 42% Model
9 REDD should mainly reward local people for emission reduction activities 88% Cross Validation
10 REDD schemes will exacerbate conﬂicts about forest land and forest resources 38% Cross Validation
11 All REDD schemes aimed at reducing CO2 emissions should also require the realization of other key beneﬁts like
poverty reduction and biodiversity conservation
89% Model
12 Improved recognition of local tenure rights is a pre-condition for eﬀective and equitable implementation of REDD
schemes
86% Cross Validation
13 REDD schemes developed with the sole objectives to reduce CO2 emissions are likely to be in contrast with
biodiversity conservation aims.
44% Cross Validation
14 REDD schemes will be an important resource to reduce poverty 57% Model
15 Without involvement of local people in their implementation, REDD projects are unlikely to be eﬀective 87% Cross Validation
16 REDD schemes will provide incentives and resources to improve forest governance (e.g. illegal logging and rule of
law)
77% Model
17 Strengthened governance is a pre-condition for successful REDD schemes 90% Model
18 REDD schemes will further weaken the limited administrative capacity of the state 14% Cross Validation
19 One of the main challenges for an eﬀect REDD Strategy in [country] is. . lack of knowledge and awareness on
REDD by relevant stakeholders
88% Cross Validation
20 One of the main challenges for an eﬀect REDD Strategy in [country] is. . achieving eﬀective coordination between
state agencies, the private sector, and civil society
92% Model
21 One of the main challenges for an eﬀect REDD Strategy in [country] is. . the lack of technical expertise for
monitoring carbon emissions and sequestration
73% Cross Validation
22 One of the main challenges for an eﬀect REDD Strategy in [country] is. . the delay in the clariﬁcation of tenure
rights
82% Model
23 One of the main challenges for an eﬀect REDD Strategy in [country] is. . contradictions among laws and
regulations in forestry, agriculture and other sectors
79% Model
24 One of the main challenges for an eﬀect REDD Strategy in [country] is. . social conﬂict and local resistance 56% Cross Validation
25 One of the main challenges for an eﬀect REDD Strategy in [country] is. . eﬀectively addressing main drivers of
deforestation without compromising development objectives
79% Cross Validation
26 One of the main challenges for an eﬀect REDD Strategy in [country] is. . achieving broad consensus on changes in
existing land use plans
83% Model
27 One of the main challenges for an eﬀect REDD Strategy in [country] is. . low capacity to enforce laws and
regulations
81% Cross Validation
28 One of the main challenges for an eﬀect REDD Strategy in [country] is. . negotiating with powerful special
interests inﬂuencing the main drivers of deforestation
70% Cross Validation
29 Scientiﬁc experts are the best and ﬁnal authority on REDD 18% Cross Validation
30 Scientiﬁc experts dominate the national REDD policy discussion, at the expense of other relevant interests (e.g.
business and civil society organizations)
34% Model
31 REDD schemes are also likely to help countries to cope or adapt to the impacts of climate change 73% Model
32 REDD schemes should always require permission from local forest resource users in the form of Free Prior and
Informed Consent (FPIC)
77% Cross Validation
33 Forest conservation schemes, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks should all
be eligible for REDD
81% Model
34 REDD mechanisms are unlikely to be eﬀective in reducing national level emissions because of diﬃculties in
controlling leakage and in assuring the additionality and permanence
43% Cross Validation
35 A national approach (for reference levels, MRV, rewards etc.) is necessary to ensure eﬀectiveness of REDD
schemes (as compared to project-based approach)
66% Model
Appendix A. Methods
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Appendix B. Results
Models excluding organizations based in Central Kalimantan are presented in Tables B.2 and B.3. We ﬁnd only minor diﬀerences in coeﬃcient
sign and signiﬁcance in comparison to the models with Central Kalimantan, with two exceptions. First, the Market variable, which has estimated p-
values only slightly below 0.05 in the models with all observations, has a p-value slightly above 0.05 in some of the models without Central
Kalimantan. The second diﬀerence is found in Model 4. In this model, a diﬀerent set of clusters, which do not correspond well to the Civic
Environmentalism/Ecological Modernization clustering found to be consistent across the other models is found. As this is not the lowest BIC model,
and as the other models are consistent with one another and with the models including the observations from Central Kalimantan, we concentrate on
the models including Central Kalimantan in the body of the paper.
Table B1
Estimated Latent Class Regression model with 3 clusters, No Comment versus Ecological Modernization. * = sig. at 0.05, ** = sig. at 0.01, *** = sig. at 0.001.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept −0.629
(0.494)
−10.0
(12.9)
−0.880
(0.690)
−1.15
(0.711)
6.00
(4.78)
−9.87
(12.7)
Community −0.657
(1.90)
−0.996
(1.60)
−0.600
(1.52)
−0.816
(1.29)
−0.695
(1.20)
−0.900
(1.35)
Market 0.959
(5.56)
−0.249
(5.19)
−0.204
(4.53)
−0.984
(4.30)
−1.14
(3.93)
−1.06
(4.55)
Policy & Research −5.19
(4.46)
−4.43
(2.90)
−3.79
(2.95)
−4.61
(2.59)
−3.94
(2.57)
−5.01
(2.57)
Democracy 0.249*
(0.112)
−0.132
(0.0932)
−0.165
(0.0845)
Primary Capital 0.949
(1.03)
1.15
(1.08)
0.858*
(0.435)
1.47
(1.04)
GDP Per Capita (ln) −0.339
(0.195)
1.06
(1.51)
−0.831
(0.570)
1.02
(1.48)
Research/Academic 0.389
(1.93)
0.508
(1.41)
0.271
(1.44)
0.227
(1.26)
0.0692
(1.27)
0.494
(1.20)
Domestic NGO −13.2***
(0.000)
−40.4***
(0.000)
−13.0***
(0.000)
−16.5***
(0.000)
−12.0***
(0.000)
−19.5***
(0.000)
Private Sector 2.35
(1.33)
2.48*
(1.16)
2.29*
(1.01)
2.20**
(0.776)
2.12**
(0.723)
2.29**
(0.856)
International NGO −1.66
(2.74)
−1.47
(2.11)
−1.63
(2.16)
−1.55
(1.81)
−1.55
(1.77)
−1.49
(1.77)
Donor Agency −2.02
(3.34)
−1.94
(2.78)
−1.85
(2.63)
−2.02
(2.52)
−1.71
(2.35)
−2.11
(2.42)
Country Fixed Eﬀects Yes No No No No No
N 428 428 428 428 428 428
BIC 9148 9115 9102 9101 9117 9113
Table B2
Estimated Latent Class Regression model with 3 clusters, Civic Environmentalism versus Ecological Modernization, without organizations based in Central Kalimantan. * = sig. at 0.05,
** = sig. at 0.01, *** = sig. at 0.001.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 0.445**
(0.147)
3.14
(4.29)
−2.25***
(0.556)
0.422
(0.412)
−6.25**
(2.35)
3.04
(4.32)
Community 3.31***
(0.978)
2.72***
(0.842)
2.62**
(0.837)
−1.29
(0.764)
2.43**
(0.810)
2.58**
(0.830)
Market −3.74
(1.91)
−2.46
(1.52)
−3.07*
(1.54)
2.12
(1.30)
−3.18*
(1.50)
−2.41
(1.50)
Policy & Research 0.879
(0.616)
0.515
(0.489)
0.466
(0.484)
−0.373
(0.453)
0.512
(0.473)
0.548
(0.485)
Democracy 0.507***
(0.0594)
0.0555
(0.0434)
0.0917**
(0.0355)
Primary Capital 0.559
(0.315)
−0.764*
(0.387)
0.613***
(0.168)
−0.939*
(0.380)
GDP Per Capita (ln) −0.801***
(0.0914)
−0.624
(0.507)
0.518*
(0.252)
−0.580
(0.506)
Research/Academic 1.76
(0.926)
1.18
(0.627)
1.22
(0.623)
−0.974
(0.570)
1.08
(0.611)
1.03
(0.622)
Domestic NGO 1.81**
(0.596)
1.57***
(0.464)
1.58***
(0.471)
−0.996*
(0.422)
1.58***
(0.461)
1.54***
(0.457)
Private Sector 0.587
(1.21)
0.711
(0.707)
0.710
(0.693)
−0.370
(0.577)
0.789
(0.673)
0.689
(0.694)
International NGO 0.555
(0.741)
0.0188
(0.620)
0.0796
(0.612)
0.502
(0.502)
0.122
(0.596)
−0.0521
(0.605)
Donor Agency 0.756
(0.664)
0.450
(0.597)
0.471
(0.587)
0.202
(0.487)
0.452
(0.588)
0.335
(0.584)
Country Fixed Eﬀects Yes No No No No No
N 401 401 401 401 401 401
BIC 8589 8559 8547 8549 8563 8558
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Table B3
Estimated Latent Class Regression model with 3 clusters, No Comment versus Ecological Modernization, without organizations based in Central Kalimantan. * = sig. at 0.05, ** = sig. at
0.01, *** = sig. at 0.001.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept −0.177
(0.416)
−9.73
(14.3)
−0.947
(0.733)
−0.816
(1.11)
5.96
(5.30)
−9.52
(13.2)
Community −0.932
(1.89)
−0.833
(1.70)
−0.431
(1.60)
−1.54
(2.57)
−0.488
(1.27)
−0.606
(1.39)
Market −2.11
(6.84)
−2.43
(6.33)
−2.19
(5.46)
−0.147
(5.92)
−3.12
(4.56)
−3.39
(5.34)
Policy & Research −4.31
(3.37)
−4.36
(3.09)
−3.68
(3.27)
−5.62
(4.25)
−3.85
(2.88)
−4.90
(2.65)
Democracy −0.253*
(0.113)
−0.138
(0.0980)
−0.171
(0.0910)
Primary Capital −0.388
(0.738)
1.21
(1.22)
1.75*
(0.819)
1.50
(1.09)
GDP Per Capita (ln) −0.0728
(0.141)
1.02
(1.67)
−0.833
(0.630)
0.984
(1.54)
Research/Academic 0.400
(1.56)
0.612
(1.43)
0.356
(1.47)
−1.54
(2.57)
0.145
(1.32)
0.590
(1.21)
Domestic NGO −13.2***
(0.000)
−12.4***
(0.000)
−13.0
(0.000)
−17.4***
(0.000)
−12.3***
(0.000)
−12.8***
(0.000)
Private Sector 2.42
(1.43)
2.68
(1.31)
2.45*
(1.08)
1.73
(1.03)
2.27**
(0.790)
2.43*
(0.956)
International NGO −1.68
(2.63)
−1.41
(2.31)
−1.58
(2.29)
−1.28
(2.53)
−1.49
(1.99)
−1.50
(1.92)
Donor Agency −2.05
(3.21)
−1.84
(2.97)
−1.73
(2.77)
−1.50
(1.44)
−1.58
(2.48)
−2.04
(2.51)
Country Fixed Eﬀects Yes No No No No No
N 401 401 401 401 401 401
BIC 8589 8559 8547 8549 8563 8558
Table B4
Predicted probabilities of cluster membership by organization type, based on Model 3. All other variables set to their means.
Organization
Type
Ecological
Modernization
Civic
Environmentalism
No Comment
Government 0.798 0.140 0.062
Research/
Academic
0.590 0.350 0.0599
Domestic NGO 0.547 0.453 0.000
Private Sector 0.477 0.161 0.363
International
NGO
0.808 0.180 0.0122
Donor Agency 0.770 0.221 0.00940
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01. Effective 02. Affordable 03. Fair 04. Funds only 05. Offsets
06. No monocultures 07. National only 08. Largeíscale rewards 09. Local rewards 10. Exacerbate conflicts
11. Coíbenefits 12. Tenure rights 13. CO2 vs. Biodiversity 14. Reduce poverty 15. Involve locals
16. Improve forest governance 17. Governance first 18. Weaken state 19. Lack of knowledge 20. Poor coordination
21. Technical limits 22. Clarify tenure 23. Legal contradictions 24. Social conflict 25. Address drivers
26. Land use consensus 27. Enforcement capacity 28. Special interests 29. Science is authority 30. Science dominates
31. Adaptation benefits 32. FPIC 33. Forest conservation 34. Leakage and permanence 35. National approach best
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Fig. B1. Percentage responses across all response categories, No Comment group. Created using ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
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BRAíCivic Environmentalism BRAíEcological Modernization BRAíNo Comment
CMRíCivic Environmentalism CMRíEcological Modernization CMRíNo Comment
IDNíCivic Environmentalism IDNíEcological Modernization IDNíNo Comment
NPLíCivic Environmentalism NPLíEcological Modernization NPLíNo Comment
PERíCivic Environmentalism PERíEcological Modernization PERíNo Comment
PNGíCivic Environmentalism PNGíEcological Modernization PNGíNo Comment
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Fig. B2. Discourse cluster distribution by organizational type and country. Created using ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
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Fig. B3. ROC Curves and Area Under the Curve for Model 3. Plotted with
pROC (Robins et al., 2011) in R 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2015).
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